Abstract
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the feasibility and sustainability of regional trade integration in the Americas as envisaged by the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).
The benefits from achieving regional trade integration in the Americas have been discussed extensively.
1 In a nutshell, the eventual elimination of trade barriers is expected to generate large increases in trade and investment flows that would benefit all member countries.
To many, regional trade integration is perceived not only as a natural element of the process of globalization but also as an essential ingredient to reach the ultimate goal of sustained growth and development that has proved so elusive for most of the countries in the region. The renewed interest by a number of policymakers in LAC in the trade integration approach is, therefore, consistent with the current adverse international financial environment.
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After all, as learned from the experience of NAFTA, successful trade agreements have been an efficient mechanism to attract sustained inflows of foreign direct investment. This paper argues that certain policy requirements are needed at the country level to ensure the permanence of an FTAA. The basic premise behind the need for these requirements is that a policy regime, such as a free trade area, will not be permanent if adverse and unanticipated shocks create strong incentives to abandon the regime. 9 In identifying key prerequisites for a sustainable FTAA, this paper complements previous studies that focus on testing whether countries in the LAC region are economically and politically prepared to meet the demands of an FTAA.
While recognizing that a number of macro, micro, and political variables identified in previous studies are essential, this paper argues that there are additional financial conditions remained strong. In other words, perceived temporary adverse effects affecting exports do not seem to distract investors from the potential permanent benefits of long-term investment. 7. Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) allows the US president to negotiate trade deals and bring them back to Congress for an expedited, up-or-down vote. Amendments are not allowed. 8. For example, Brazil had made the approval of fast-track authority a condition for engaging in serious FTAA negotiations. 9. We can draw a parallel with the need to satisfy certain pre-conditions for the stability of a fixed exchange rate regime. For example, a country following a fixed exchange rate system will find it very troublesome to defend the peg in the presence of an adverse shock if the country's banking system is weak. The reason is that to defend the parity the authorities may need to increase domestic interest rates, which in turn would hurt already fragile banks. Experience shows that if forced to choose, most countries would let necessary to preserve the sustainability of the trade integration efforts. The paper claims that these additional preconditions are: (a) sustainable public debts as determined by the achievement of "credible" and "sustainable" structural fiscal balances and (b) compatible exchange rate regimes across trading partners. The paper argues that studies failing to evaluate progress towards reaching these conditions will not be able to appropriately assess individual countries' capacity to join the FTAA on a sustainable basis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II justifies the need for identifying financial prerequisites ensuring the sustainability of trade integration efforts and elaborates on them. Section III empirically examines whether countries in the LAC are satisfying these requisites. Section IV concludes the paper.
II. NECESSARY FINANCIAL PRECONDITIONS FOR FTAA SUSTAINABILITY
The need to identify policies that ensure FTAA sustainability arises from the nature of the proposed agreement. In contrast to other more comprehensive regional integration efforts, such as the European Union, the FTAA does not envisage the creation of regional institutions to deal with collective problems. As is NAFTA, the proposed FTAA is only a trade area, not a "community" sharing common rules in a variety of economic aspects beside trade. In analyzing NAFTA, Pastor (2001) has stressed the important shortcomings that derive from the absence of supra-national institutions able to enforce policy decisions aimed at ensuring the continuous improvement of the integration arrangement. Pastor argues that a major shortcoming in the NAFTA charter is that it assumes that the social, economic, and political consequences of dismantling trade and investment barriers will be trivial. In his own words, "NAFTA…overlooked the concept of externalities…that markets generate unintended but costly social, environmental, and political consequences" (Pastor 2001, 5) . I fully agree and argue that similar, but even larger problems would arise with an FTAA-simply by the sheer diversity of the large number of countries involved.
However, while I concur with those analysts strongly supporting the creation of supranational institutions, 10 I take a more pragmatic view and assume that such supranational institutions will not be in the making in the medium term; the political consensus needed for the creation of such institutions does not exist. As stated in the introduction, this paper should be seen as a complement to previous studies that have tested whether countries in the LAC region are prepared, both in economic and political terms, to join an FTAA. The most comprehensive analyses can be found in Hufbauer and Schott (1994) and Schott (2001) . The authors develop "readiness indicators", a set of macro (price stability, budget discipline, national savings, external debt and currency stability), microeconomic (government's reliance on market-oriented policies and on trade taxes as a form of tax revenue) and political (index of political rights and civil liberties, index of health, education and per-capita income) variables that, when combined, allow for the assessment of "the capacity of a country to compete in the global market place" (Schott, 2001, 17) . 11 Countries can then be ranked according to readiness indicator scores (see table 1, first column).
10. Including, among others, Grinspun and Kreklewich (2001) , Grubel (2001) and Pastor (2001) . 11. The basic idea in the Hufbauer and Schott papers is that the more stable a country is in terms of its economic performance and the more advanced a social agenda is in terms of securing human rights and social services, the more "ready" it is to join the FTAA. Not surprisingly, there is significant overlapping between some of the variables in Schott's "readiness indicator" and the WEF "competitiveness index," particularly among the macroeconomic variables. Indeed, as appendix I shows, the similarities between these macroeconomic stability indices are large enough to have important coincidences in the ranking of countries, especially at the top and bottom of the ranking. 12 The key difference between the two indicators, and an important contributor explaining the different ordering of countries in the "overall indicators," is the inclusion of "technology" variables in WEF.
In contrast to Schott and WEF, Lora's (2001) 
Further Conditions Needed to Ensure Successful and Sustainable Free Trade Agreements
While I recognize that the variables identified by recent research are necessary to assess the capacity of a country to join a free trade area, I argue that those variables are not sufficient to ensure the sustainability of an integration effort. As stated in the introduction, the experience in Latin America has repeatedly shown that policy regimes often are abandoned after large and adverse unanticipated shocks create incentives to reverse existent policies, even when these policies involve international agreements. 14 I, therefore, suggest that two additional policy requirements, both aimed at containing incentives to break the rules under a free trade agreement, need to be satisfied. The first is sustainable public debts as determined by the achievement of credible and sustainable structural fiscal balances. The second is compatible exchange rate systems across trading partners. I now proceed to expand on these two policy conditions.
13. To my knowledge this is the most complete study of advances in the reform process in the LAC region. 14. As stated by Iglesias (2001) , most of the early post-war trade agreements in Latin America "fell into open crisis in the 1980s" (128). This is not surprising as the 1980s can be characterized as the worst crisis period (in terms of both duration and intensity) in recent Latin American history.
Sustainable Public Debts
My claim that the criterion of credible and sustainable public debts is essential for the success of trade agreements in the LAC region is based on its long history of crises: From the debt crisis of 1982 to the tequila crisis of 1994-95 to the ongoing crisis in Argentina, a common root can be identified: unsustainable public debts.
To use a more recent episode, take, for example, the so-called "impasse" in Mercosur in 2000-01, just before Argentina's default. 15 Confronted with increasing problems in servicing its public debt (external and internal), Argentina's authorities faced during the period 2000-01 serious pressures for either abandoning or at least relaxing tariff commitments under Mercosur.
To those opposed to the trade agreement, it was difficult to understand why the Argentine government did not increase revenues from external trade sufficiently to compensate for the sharp reduction in domestic tax collection that accompanied the deep recession that had inflicted the country for three consecutive years. 16 Regardless of the pros and cons of that argument, the key issue is that a major policy inconsistency, such as unsustainable public debt, provides strong political incentives to deviate from integration agreements when it is perceived that the costs from such accords exceed their benefits.
It is important to define what is meant here by public debt sustainability. After all, the recent studies surveyed in the previous section include several indicators of fiscal stability: fiscal deficit as percentage of GDP and external debt as percentage of exports in Schott's readiness indicator and levels of public spending in the WEF competitiveness index. The concept of public debt sustainability used here has two components. The first relates to a country's capacity to service its debt on a sustainable basis, and the second refers to a country's willingness to service its obligation. The first component involves using the well-known methodology advanced by Blanchard and further elaborated by Talvi and Vegh (1998) . They define public debt as being sustainable if, under reasonable assumptions of economic growth and interest rates, a country is able to generate structural primary fiscal balances that would allow keeping constant the ratio of debt to GDP. The structural primary fiscal balance is obtained by stripping the cyclical or temporary components from the observed primary balance results. An important benefit of this methodology is that it eliminates large one-time events that temporarily inflate government revenues and, therefore, could give the impression of sustainability to debt services that are unsustainable in the medium-term. 15. See, Intal (2001) . 16. Indeed, in 1999 Argentina increased tariffs on a number of items. 17. As will be discussed in the next section, Venezuela, where the fiscal stance is highly dependent on the very volatile price of oil, is a case in point.
A key reason for my preferring this indicator of a country's capacity to service its debt over traditional ratios of fiscal soundness, such as debt to exports or debt to GDP (ratios used in the Schott and WEF studies), is that although these ratios have the benefit of being easy to calculate and readily available, they can be seriously misleading at a given point in time. Take Argentina once again. Throughout the long gestation period of the Argentine crisis (1999) (2000) (2001) it was not unusual to hear some analysts claim that the country did not have a debt problem. The argument was that the ratio of government debt to GDP in Argentina (49 percent by end 2000)
was much smaller than that of several developed countries, such as Italy (111 percent by end 2000)! The obvious mistake made by supporters of this argument is that they ignored that what matters is not the stock of debt itself but the overall capacity of the country to service that debt, and that such servicing capacity depends crucially on the country's ability to maintain continuous access to the international capital markets. While industrialized countries (a category that includes Italy) do not confront "sudden stops" of capital inflows when facing economic difficulties, lack of access to private external sources of finance has been a typical feature of LAC countries during crises.
The second component of the concept of debt sustainability used here, namely, the country's willingness to pay, is related to market perceptions about the government's political attitude toward its creditors. International perceptions about a country's "creditworthiness," as manifested in the spread between the yield on sovereign bonds and the yield on US Treasury bonds, reflect not only the market estimation about a country's capacity to generate necessary fiscal surpluses to service its obligations but also the government's commitment to sustain these balances and to use the proceeds to pay its liabilities.
I believe that this second component of debt sustainability is as important as the first component. Consider the example of Brazil in mid-2002. As will be shown in section II, it is easy to demonstrate that Brazil was moving towards a sustainable debt path, from the point of view of establishing its capacity to pay. However, in early June of 2002, electoral polls showed a significant increase in the probability of a presidential candidate, Mr. da Silva (Lula) to win the elections later that year. Because the markets perceived Mr. Lula as a "populist," fears developed about a potential future Brazilian government's commitment to continue on a sustainable debt path.
18 By end-June 2002, spreads on sovereign bonds had skyrocketed. The extremely high spreads raised the country's external financing costs and limited the availability of external sources of finance. The consequent balance of payments pressures translated into a depreciation 18. "Lula" had also stated in the past that Brazil should default on its debt. of the exchange rate, which, in turn, aggravated the debt situation (due to the large proportion of dollar-denominated debt) and required further fiscal adjustments.
At the time of this writing, it was too early to know how the Brazilian story would end, but the basic message from this experience is that due to deteriorated perceptions of creditworthiness (in the Brazilian case, due not to the current but to the expected actions of a future government) a country may find itself "willing to prove the market wrong." In that situation, incentives for finding additional sources of government revenue will emerge because of the need to raise funds to continue servicing the government debt. Pressures for abandoning a "low tariff approach" may develop, risking the sustainability of a free trade agreement.
Evidence on debt sustainability based on the concepts discussed above will be presented for a selected sample of LAC countries in section III. I will then analyze how use of these criteria affects the conclusions from previous studies regarding the capacity of a country to join (and I add, on a sustainable basis) a free trade area.
Compatible Exchange Rate Regimes Across Trading Partners
Can a regional trade area be sustainable if its members follow different exchange rate regimes?
This highly debatable question has resulted in quite different answers. 19 To some, integration arrangements need to share a common currency to be sustainable. 20 These analysts base their assessment on the experience of the European Union. The currency crisis of the ERM (Exchange Rate Mechanism) in 1992 is cited to demonstrate that not even a fixed exchange rate system is sufficient to ensure the stability of an integration process; instead trade integration is perceived as the first step towards higher degrees of economic and financial integration, culminating in the adoption of a single currency.
To others, however, all of the integration advances in the LAC region, whether NAFTA, the Andean Community or the FTAA, are just efforts towards free trade areas, with no intention-so far-of establishing a common market a la European Union and, even less, a monetary union. This latter view is held by most governments in LAC and by multilateral organizations. The straightforward conclusion from this view is that countries are free to choose their exchange rate system and that such choices need not impose a constraint on the success of an FTAA.
19. For an analysis of a number of issues related to this subject, see Fernandez-Arias et al. (2002) . 20. See, for example, Grubel (1999 A convergence of "adverse shocks" hit Argentina in 1998-99. First, the Argentine peso, pegged one-to-one to the US dollar, experienced a large real appreciation, thus hurting its ability to compete against its major trading partner: Europe. Partly due to the loss of international competitiveness, Argentina entered a recession and domestic investment declined significantly.
Second, in the midst of the recession, Brazil devalued its currency against the US dollar. The devaluation implied that Brazilian consumers found imports from Argentina relatively more expensive, while Brazilian products became relatively cheaper to Argentinean consumers. Since
Brazil is the second largest trading partner for Argentina, the Brazilian devaluation hit Argentina by further curtailing its sources of growth and, therefore, exacerbated the recession.
This event brought heated academic and political discussions: were Mercosur and the important share of Argentina's trade with Brazil the culprits for Argentina's exacerbated problems or was Argentina's convertibility the straitjacket that did not allow Argentina to regain competitiveness? To some, the problem even had a "moral" dimension: was the Brazilian change of exchange rate regime (it had a "crawling band" before 1999) "fair" to Argentina in the context of Mercosur?
While different views will certainly remain about this episode, the lesson that I derive is that two trading partners on the opposite extremes of the exchange rate-regime spectrum (fully fixed and fully flexible) can only be sustainable if each has a quite diversified trade pattern, that is, trades extensively with other countries. If, by contrast, there is high interdependence in trade between the two partners, the trade arrangement will tend not to be sustainable as an adverse shock hitting the flexible exchange rate country will severely affect the fixed exchange rate 21. In early 2002, Argentina abandoned the convertibility law and moved to a managed float of its exchange rate.
partner. This would create incentives to abandon the free trade agreement between the two member states.
Section III will review the current combination of exchange rate systems in order to assess whether major incompatibilities affecting the sustainability of free trade agreements are present in the region.
III. CAN A FREE TRADE AREA FOR THE AMERICAS BE SUSTAINABLE? A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE SUSTAINABILITY INDICATORS
This section briefly analyzes whether the sustainability conditions discussed above are met in the LAC region. The analysis is not meant to be exhaustive and will not cover all countries in the region due to lack of data readily available. Instead, the analysis is intended to shed light on the additional efforts that some countries in the region need to undertake if a free trade area, such as the FTAA, is going to become a permanent arrangement.
Are Public Debts Sustainable in Latin America?
To derive an assessment of public debt sustainability in Latin America, let us start by considering the first component of public debt sustainability discussed in section II, namely, a country's capacity to service its debt. A recent study by Ghezzi et al (2001) estimates the structural primary fiscal balances needed to achieve sustainable public debts in several Latin American countries. 1. Entirely due to high oil prices.
Source: Ghezzi et al. (2001).
The methodology in table 2 involves three steps to assess debt sustainability from the perspective of a country's capacity to service its debt. In the first step the sustainable "structural" primary balance is estimated for each country based on assumptions about "long term" rates of growth and interest rates. The estimated structural primary balance ensures that the public debt will be sustainable; that is, that the ratio of debt to GDP will remain constant over time. In the second step, the observed primary balance in 2000 is decomposed into its temporary and structural components. The temporary component of the primary balance is defined as those net revenues attributable to the business cycle and commodity fluctuations. 23 Finally, the third step calculates the "required adjustment" over the medium term to achieve debt sustainability. This adjustment is calculated by subtracting the actual structural primary balance in 2000 from the sustainable structural primary balance.
From the sole perspective of a country's capacity to pay, table 2 shows that out of the sample countries, Brazil and Mexico were on sustainable public debt paths by end-2001. In the case of Brazil, by the end of 2001, the projected (both by the government and by market specialists) primary surpluses of 3.5 percent of GDP from 2001 onwards appeared to be sufficient to maintain the fiscal stance in order. 24 During the same period, Mexico was also moving towards a sustainable path. By end-2000, the required adjustment over the medium-term to achieve debt sustainability was 0.7 percent of GDP, and the gap was projected to almost close by end-2001.
23. For a detailed step-by-step methodology, see Ghezzi et al. (2001) .
The rest of the countries in the sample showed less optimistic results. While the Colombian and the Peruvian cases were unclear (namely, there was important uncertainties about the evolution of the fiscal stance), the cases of Ecuador and Venezuela were rather worrisome. Both countries required significant adjustment in the structural primary balance over the medium-term to achieve debt sustainability (2.1 percent for Ecuador and 3.7 for Venezuela). 25 By end-2001, neither country, however, showed progress toward achieving such an adjustment.
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As discussed in section II, analyses of debt sustainability solely based on a country's capacity to pay are incomplete and insufficient to assess whether, indeed, a country is "free of debt problems." Also as discussed in section II, Brazil is a case in point. While in mid-2002, Brazil continued to maintain primary fiscal surpluses at levels equal or above those necessary to achieve a sustainable debt path (from the perspective of its capacity to pay), the markets lost confidence about the willingness of future governments to maintain the required fiscal primary surplus and/or to transfer the resources from those surpluses toward servicing the debt. Chart 2a compares the evolution of markets' forecasts for 2002 Brazil's fiscal primary surpluses with that of the spread on Brazil's sovereign bonds. Clearly, one could not blame the sharp increase in spreads on the fiscal stance, as forecasts about the primary surplus for 2002 signaled an improvement of the fiscal stance during the current government. Chart 2b compares the spreads with electoral poll results. As the probability of an electoral win for Mr. da Silva increased, the spreads increased. Thus, the high spreads for Brazil in mid-2002 were not driven by expectations of the current government deviating from a stability path but by fears about a "change of course" of a potential future government.
As a benchmark, the evolution of Mexico's bond spreads is also presented in chart 2b.
From the perspective of both its "capacity to pay" ( This experience shows that the "credibility" of sustained fiscal balances remains extremely fragile in Latin America. While this is not the place to elaborate further on this issue, the lesson that I derive is that additional research is needed in order to determine whether a country is on a sustainable path. If the "required fiscal surplus" for debt sustainability is "too high" it may lose credibility in the presence of adverse shocks, including political uncertainties.
Whether Brazil will be forced to adjust its fiscal stance considerably was an unknown at the time of writing. But with sources of finance curtailed, a potential adjustment may induce certain groups to call for an increase in import tariffs. This indeed happened in Chile at the end of Second, most countries in LAC have not kept a given exchange rate arrangement for a significantly long period of time (say, over a decade). A stylized fact in the region is that not only exchange rates but also exchange rate systems are quite volatile. This is illustrated in appendix II.
In section II, I discussed the incompatibility between the exchange rate systems in Mercosur (between Brazil and Argentina) during the period 1999-2001, given (a) the deep economic and financial problems that Argentina faced during that period and (b) the important concentration of trade between these two countries. Here, I will briefly examine whether there exist in the region other forms of exchange rate system incompatibilities that may jeopardize the sustainability of free trade agreements.
27. Argentina is included in the non-performing group. I start with the Andean Community (AC). In this group, Ecuador stands out for having a very different exchange rate system than its trading partners in the AC: Ecuador has recently dollarized. Some analysts have argued that this may create problems for the sustainability of the AC and for further efforts towards a free trade area involving all countries in the Americas. In what follows I argue that, because of Ecuador's trade patterns with countries in the AC, and with the rest of LAC, most of those fears are unfounded at present. Table 4 shows trade between regional trading partners (as percentage of total trade). Trade between countries in the AC is very small (less than 10 percent of total trade of the AC takes place within the Community). In the case of Ecuador, the share of the AC in its total trade is about 15 percent and the share of Ecuador in each individual partner in the AC in no case reaches more than 10 percent. Indeed, the United States is Ecuador's major trading partner (see appendix III).
Another important feature of trade in the AC is that the share of commodities in exports is extremely high in all countries, with Ecuador displaying the highest ratio in the region: 90 percent (see chart 3). During the last decade, only Bolivia, among Andean countries, has managed to significantly reduce this ratio. As a result, this trade area, in general, and Ecuador in particular, is very sensitive to commodity shocks and the business cycles of the partner countries tend to move together.
The trade characteristics of Ecuador described above minimize two potential forms of risk to the stability of a free trade area. The first potential risk arises from "common adverse external shocks" (such as a terms of trade shock) impinging on the AC. Facing an adverse shock, currencies in the AC, other than Ecuador, would tend to depreciate. 28 This depreciation of currencies in the AC would reduce the competitiveness of Ecuador's goods and services that compete internationally with similar products exported by AC countries. While in theory, this 28. With the exception of Ecuador, all the other countries in the AC maintain a floating exchange rate regime.
effect could be important, it is not in reality due to the high participation of petroleum and other commodities in Ecuador's exports. This feature implies that a depreciated currency of a partner country within the AC-or for that matter within a free trade area encompassing all countries in LAC-will not have a significant effect on Ecuador's revenues from exports. This, of course, does not speak very favorably about the overall relevance of the AC.
My conclusion is, therefore, that as long as Ecuador's exports continue to be concentrated in commodities with its overall trade patterns oriented more towards industrial countries rather than LAC, its choice of exchange rate system will not create a threat to the stability of a trade area. It is interesting to note, however, that if the proposed FTAA significantly increases trade among LAC countries and also contributes to diversifying the basket of exports, dollarization in Ecuador may actually become an issue, similar to that faced by Mercosur in 1999 Mercosur in -2001 Turning to the Central America Common Market (CACM), it is interesting to note that the trade area shares some similarities with the AC. First, the intra-area trade is very small: 12 percent (see table 4 ). Second, with the exception of Costa Rica, the dependence on commodity exports is very large (over 50 percent). Third, the two dollarized economies in the trade area, Panama and El Salvador largely trade with the United States and with "the rest of the world."
However, a significant difference between the AC and the CACM is that the latter is much more "open" in terms of the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. While, by 1999, this ratio reached about 85 percent in the CACM, the ratio was only around 40 percent in the AC. Another important difference with AC is that several countries within CACM compete with each other (and with Mexico) in the "maquila sector" (largely the textile industry).
Largely because of the small size of these economies and the small proportion of intratrade, no incompatibilities can be found between the different exchange rate regimes in CACM that could pose a threat to the stability of a trade agreement. None of the countries in this group can gain much by raising tariffs to a partner in CACM and even less to a partner within an FTAA.
29. This conclusion also applies to a trade agreement with other LAC countries as trade between the AC and the rest of LAC is also limited. 
